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Debunking Humphrey’s Executor
Daniel A. Crane*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 1935 Humphrey’s Executor decision paved the way
for the modern administrative state by holding that Congress could constitu-
tionally limit the President’s powers to remove heads of regulatory agencies.
The Court articulated a quartet of features of the Federal Trade Commission’s
(“FTC”) statutory design that ostensibly justified the Commission’s constitu-
tional independence.  It was to be nonpartisan and apolitical, uniquely expert,
and performing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial, rather than executive,
functions.  In recent years, the staying power of Humphrey’s Executor has
been called into question as a matter of constitutional design.  This Essay re-
considers Humphrey’s Executor from a different angle.  At the end of a one-
hundred-year natural experiment, the Commission bears almost no resem-
blance to the Progressive-technocratic vision articulated by the Court.  The
Commission is not politically independent, uniquely expert, or principally leg-
islative or adjudicative.  Rather, it is essentially a law enforcement agency be-
holden to the will of Congress.  This finding has potentially important
implications for agency design, constitutional doctrine and theory, and under-
standing of agency functioning.
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INTRODUCTION
In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,1 the United States Su-
preme Court paved the way for the modern administrative state by
holding that Congress could constitutionally limit the President’s
power to remove the heads of administrative agencies for political
reasons.2  The Court held that President Franklin Roosevelt’s removal
of Federal Trade Commissioner William E. Humphrey without cause
contravened the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 which constitution-
ally limited the President’s removal power to “for cause” termination.4
Although the immediate stakes in the case were picayune—some
$3,000 in back pay for the deceased Commissioner5—the implications
for the constitutional, administrative, and political order were im-
mense.  Broadly speaking, that decision served to legitimize the mod-
ern regulatory state and remains one of the iconic judicial pillars of
the technocratic, independent administrative system.6
In Humphrey’s Executor, Justice Sutherland’s affirmation regard-
ing the constitutionality of FTC Commissioner immunity from presi-
dential removal for political reasons rested on a quartet of broad
assertions concerning the character of the FTC.  According to the
Court, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is (1) nonpolitical and
nonpartisan, (2) uniquely expert, (3) “quasi-legislative,” and
(4) “quasi-judicial,” rather than executive.7  Together, these four qual-
ities ostensibly lent the FTC a character different from that of ordi-
1 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
2 Id. at 629.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
4 See id. § 41; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629.
5 The executor of Humphrey’s estate sought to recover $3,043.06 plus interest.  Brief for
Samuel F. Rathbun, Executor at 2, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (No.
667), 1935 WL 32964 (Mar. 19, 1935).
6 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 17 (1998) (asserting that Humphrey’s Executor “ratifies the Administra-
tive State”); Larry Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway?  Of History and Theory, Bruce
Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 926 (1996) (calling Humphrey’s
Executor one of the “administrative state’s main support beams”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Indepen-
dent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 94 (“Humphrey’s Executor has long been viewed as the
fundamental constitutional charter of the independent regulatory commissions.”); Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 485, 520 (2009) (calling Humphrey’s Executor “truly
the seminal decision of the modern administrative state”).
7 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628.
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nary law enforcers, hence the legitimacy of insulating commissioners
from the President’s constitutional responsibility to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”8  At its core, Humphrey’s Executor
rests on the assertion that the FTC is something other than a conven-
tional law enforcement agency and thus merits a different position in
the political order than executive departments like the Justice Depart-
ment that also enforce laws concerning antitrust and consumer
protection.9
Unitary executive proponents and critics of the modern regula-
tory state have sharply criticized the Court’s assumptions in
Humphrey’s Executor.  They have argued that, contrary to the Court’s
assertion, the FTC serves quintessentially executive functions10 and
that it impairs the President’s ability to cohesively and consistently
enforce the laws.11  In a recent concurring opinion, Judge Brett Kava-
naugh of the D.C. Circuit launched a vigorous assault on Humphrey’s
Executor, arguing that the decision deserved the same overruling as
the company it kept during the 1935 term.12  Despite a rising tide of
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
9 See About the Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/index
.html (last visited Oct.17, 2015).  On the scope and role of the FTC, see generally J. Howard
Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer Protection at 100: 1972 Redux or Protecting Mar-
kets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2157 (2015); Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Ilene
Knable Gotts, Looking Ahead: The FTC’s Role in Information Technology Markets, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1876 (2015); Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC’s Study and Advocacy Authority in Its
Second Century: A Look Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902 (2015); Richard J. Gilbert &
Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919 (2015); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Poten-
tial of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015); David A. Hyman & William E.
Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1948 (2015); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the “Mossified” Procedures for FTC
Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979 (2015); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Weigh the Label, Not
the Tractor: What Goes on the Scale in an FTC Unfairness Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1999 (2015); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Rocky Relationship Between the Federal
Trade Commission and Administrative Law, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2026 (2015); Edith Rami-
rez, The FTC: A Framework for Promoting Competition and Protecting Consumers, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 2049 (2015); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 2064 (2015); David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission’s Sec-
ond Hundred Years, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101 (2015); Joshua Wright & John Yun, Stop
Chug-a-lug-a-lugin 5 Miles an Hour on Your International Harvester: How Modern Economics
Brings the FTC’s Unfairness Analysis Up to Speed with Digital Platforms, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 2130 (2015).
10 Miller, supra note 6, at 93 (“It was nonsense to assert that the FTC did not act in an R
executive role.”).
11 Justice Scalia has been a particularly sharp critic of Humphrey’s Executor. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 724–27 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Humphrey’s
Executor as “six quick pages devoid of textual or historical precedent”).
12 In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 441–42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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unitary executive sentiment, reflected most recently in the Supreme
Court’s Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB decision,13 Humphrey’s Exec-
utor remains a bedrock precedent for the administrative state.14
In 2014, the FTC celebrated its centennial anniversary.  With the
demise of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1992,15 the
FTC is the surviving agency prototype for the alphabet soup of New
Deal agencies that would follow.  The Supreme Court’s examination
of the FTC’s character and validation of its independence served to
bless an entire category of agencies that followed the FTC blueprint.16
With a hundred years of natural experiment, it is worth pausing to
consider the actual experience of the FTC and ask whether the
Court’s quartet of assumptions in Humphrey’s Executor were correct.
In fact, they were largely incorrect—or, at least, fail to capture
the dominant character of the FTC over time.  First, the FTC’s inde-
pendence and nonpartisanship are overstated.17  Work in political sci-
ence and economics has shown that the FTC tends to be compliant to
the will of Congress and particular congresspersons.18  This may create
some separation of powers between the FTC and other executive
branch agencies that pursue similar goals under the will of the Presi-
dent, but separation of powers is a different justification than the sort
of technocratic independence suggested in Humphrey’s Executor.
Second, the FTC is not uniquely expert.19  For much of its history,
presidents appointed Commissioners as a matter of political pa-
tronage rather than expertise in competition and consumer protec-
tion.20  Even as the FTC grew into a more professional and expert
agency in the last several decades, it enjoyed no comparative advan-
tage in expertise over purely executive agencies, like the Justice De-
partment’s Antitrust Division, which fulfills almost identical
13 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (hold-
ing unconstitutional provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act creating accounting oversight board
where members of board could only be removed for cause by Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, whose Commissioners also could only be removed for cause).
14 Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 778 (2013) (observing that “[t]he constitutional status of
independent agencies stems . . . from . . . Humphrey’s Executor”).
15 See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. R
16 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410–11 (1989) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the United States Sentencing Commission and invoking Humphrey’s Executor to
support limits on the President’s removal of Commission  members).
17 See infra Part II.A.
18 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. R
19 See infra Part II.B.
20 See infra note 146 and accompanying text. R
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functions.21  Third, the description of the FTC as “quasi-legislative”
has been more wrong than right.22  In its original antitrust capacity—
the sole capacity it had at the time of Humphrey’s Executor—the FTC
has not been legislative at all, issuing virtually no substantive rules.23
It has issued some consumer protection rules in the last few decades,
although rulemaking remains a very limited portion of its docket.24
Finally, adjudication is a very small part of what the agency does.25  A
new empirical study, reported in this Essay, shows that the FTC’s pre-
dominant mode of law enforcement is through consent decrees, which
involve no adjudication, and that the FTC is more prone to sue in
federal district court as a plaintiff than to adjudicate matters adminis-
tratively in the event there is adjudication.
The upshot is that the FTC has essentially become the executive
agency that the Humphrey’s Executor Court denied it was.  The FTC
functions primarily by enforcing the antitrust and consumer protec-
tion laws as a plaintiff, no more expert than the executive branch
agencies doing the same thing.  The principal structural difference
from the executive branch agencies is that the FTC is beholden to
Congress rather than to the President.
One may doubt the relevance of these findings for two reasons,
one legal and one functional.  First, post-Humphrey’s Executor deci-
sions on the constitutionality of limiting the President’s removal
power have not relied on the justifications discussed above.  After
Morrison v. Olson,26 which allowed the independence of the indepen-
dent counsel—an obviously executive function—Humphrey’s Execu-
tor’s reliance on the FTC’s ostensibly nonexecutive character to justify
independence seems quaint.  Second, a substantial body of literature
has shown the President’s removal power and executive control over
administrative agencies are too easily conflated.27  The President has
many devices to control agencies other than the removal power—and
even where removal power is present, other structural features may
create substantial independence.
In light of these considerations, the burden of this Essay is not to
urge reconsideration of Humphrey’s Executor on the narrow ground
21 See infra text accompanying notes 153–54. R
22 See infra Part II.C.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 168–70. R
24 See id.
25 See infra Part II.D.
26 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
27 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667 n.402 (1984).
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of its holding—that certain structural features of an agency justify its
constitutional independence from presidential removal—but rather to
debunk the case’s Progressive-technocratic narrative in light of a cen-
tury of experience.  As an archetypal case study, the FTC’s history
shows the tendency of an agency over time to shift away from its os-
tensible statutory design as a politically detached, technocratic,
rulemaking, and adjudicatory body toward a politically engaged law
enforcement organization.  This finding potentially has important im-
plications for agency design, constitutional doctrine and theory, and
understanding of agency functioning.
This Essay’s organization is as follows.  Part I situates
Humphrey’s Executor in the broader story of Progressive era techno-
cratic experimentation, contestation between the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches, and constitutional doctrine.  Part II
engages Humphrey’s Executor’s four-pronged justification for inde-
pendence and shows that it is inconsistent with the historical reality of
the FTC.  Finally, Part III considers the implications of the FTC’s ob-
served performance as a law enforcement agency for its ongoing com-
petition and consumer protection missions.
I. HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR IN CONTEXT
A. Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and the Progressive Vision for
Technocratic Independence
In constitutional history, Humphrey’s Executor assumes the role
of counterpoint and correction to the earlier unitary executive deci-
sion in Myers v. United States28 and the beginning of a line of cases
establishing the constitutional legitimacy of independent agencies.  In
Myers, Chief Justice Taft held that the President enjoyed the constitu-
tional power unilaterally to remove a postmaster appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.29  The Court rea-
soned that the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed necessarily assumed the power to re-
move executive officers for whose performance the President had ulti-
mate responsibility.30 Myers articulated a hierarchical vision of the
executive branch with the President atop, wielding plenary removal
powers over officers of the United States.31
28 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
29 Id. at 176.
30 Id. at 117 (holding that the President must have some “power of removing those for
whom he can not continue to be responsible”).
31 See id.
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The run-up to Humphrey’s Executor began in 1925, not only be-
cause that was the year of Myers, but also because in 1925 Calvin Coo-
lidge appointed William E. Humphrey as a commissioner of the
FTC.32  In 1931, Herbert Hoover appointed him to a second, seven-
year term on the Commission.33  From the outset, Humphrey proved a
most controversial commissioner.  He made vociferously clear his op-
position to almost any coercive action by the FTC to reign in business
and lambasted the FTC’s interventionist agenda.  Humphrey decried
the FTC’s “old policy of litigation” that had ostensibly rendered the
FTC “an instrument of oppression and disturbance and injury instead
of a help to business.”34  He vowed not to approve any Commission
action that did not have as its goal to “help business help itself.”35
Humphrey pushed a policy of behind-the-scenes negotiation with in-
dustry to resolve matters quietly and without the imposition of legally
enforceable sanctions.36  He went so far as to threaten criminal prose-
cution against other commissioners who publicly dissented, contrary
to new FTC rules.37  When the FTC voted to investigate ties between
DuPont, U.S. Steel, and General Motors, Humphrey, displaying his
usual tact, called his fellow commissioners men “drunk with their own
greatness.”38
Needless to say, Humphrey made some enemies.  Congressmen
who favored an interventionist FTC introduced legislation to abolish
the agency altogether.39  The newly inaugurated Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, however, had a better idea.  On July 25, 1933, a few
months into his first term, Roosevelt wrote Humphrey, politely re-
questing his resignation.40  Humphrey demurred, and Roosevelt wrote
32 See Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, The William Humphrey and Abram Myers
Years: The FTC From 1925 to 1929, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 701–02, 715 (2011).
33 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935).
34 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of An-
titrust Enforcement: A Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW
FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 63, 105 n.93 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds.,
1987) (citing E. PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 125
(1936)).
35 Id. at 78.
36 See Winerman & Kovacic, supra note 32, at 702, 713, 725 (noting that Humphrey “was R
skeptical about much enforcement activity” and “generally sought a relatively limited govern-
ment role, preferably as a facilitator for business,” and that under Humphrey the FTC expanded
its trade practice conference program and restored its settlement process).
37 Marc Winerman, The FTC at Ninety: History Through Headlines, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
871, 878–79 (2005).
38 Id. at 879.
39 Kovacic, supra note 34, at 78. R
40 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935).
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again—more forcefully—on August 31, 1933.41  This time, the Presi-
dent explained that he had no problem with Humphrey personally but
still made his concerns clear, stating, “You will, I know, realize that I
do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either
the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission,
and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I
should have a full confidence.”42  Humphrey again demurred.43  On
October 7, 1933, Roosevelt wrote Humphrey once more, this time
simply firing him.44
Humphrey died just five months later, on February 14, 1934,45 but
his passing did not moot the controversy concerning the legality of the
President’s removal of an FTC commissioner for political reasons.
The executor of Humphrey’s estate, Samuel F. Rathbun, brought suit
on Humphrey’s behalf for the five months of salary that Humphrey
allegedly should have earned between his unlawful removal and his
death.46  That suit gave rise to the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Exec-
utor decision.47
Humphrey won a final battle from the grave when the Supreme
Court ruled in his favor, thus establishing the principle that the Presi-
dent may not remove FTC commissioners for political reasons, but
only for good cause (defined in the statute as “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office”).48  The crucial turn in the Court’s
opinion comes from several paragraphs describing the character of the
FTC as something other than a conventional executive law-enforce-
ment body.49  Rather, according to the Court, the FTC is a staunchly
independent, objective, and technocratic body detached from the
hurly-burly of politics and formulating industrial policy in the clear
light of the public interest.50  For analytic convenience, the Court’s ac-
count of the FTC’s nonexecutive character can be distilled into four
components—what this Essay will refer to as the Humphrey’s Execu-
tor quartet.
41 Id. at 619.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 618.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 Id. at 619.
49 See id. at 624 (“[The FTC’s] duties are neither political nor executive, but predomi-
nantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.”).
50 See id.
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First, the Court characterized the FTC as a politically indepen-
dent and nonpartisan body.  In the opinion, Justice Sutherland stated
that the FTC is “a body which shall be independent of executive au-
thority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without
the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the
government.”51  The FTC’s independence, the Court asserted,
stemmed in part from its nonpartisan nature, emphasizing that “[t]he
commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of
its duties, act with entire impartiality.”52  One might observe that the
“non-partisan” description was facially incorrect, because the only
statutory requirement imposed by the FTC Act was—and is—that not
more than three (out of five) Commissioners be appointed from the
same party.53  But the Court qualified its explanation by observing
that, in addition to its composition, the FTC’s statutory mandate was
devoid of partisan taint, as “[i]t is charged with the enforcement of no
policy except the policy of the law.”54
The idea that the law expresses some politically and ideologically
neutral policy was surely subject to grave doubts at the time of
Humphrey’s Executor, by which time legal realism had swept the elite
law schools55 and had made serious inroads on the judiciary.56  The
Court was thus compelled to offer a qualification about the type of
“law” the FTC would practice, which contains the second ingredient
in the Court’s characterization of the FTC—expertise.  “Like the In-
terstate Commerce Commission, [the FTC’s] members are called
upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts appointed
51 Id. at 625–26.
52 Id. at 624.
53 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (“Not more than three of the Commissioners shall be members of
the same political party.”).
54 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624.  For discussion on congressional intent that the FTC
be insulated from politics, see ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS 188–95 (1972).
55 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169–92 (1992).
56 Signposts of the influences of legal realism on the judiciary include the publication of
Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process in 1921 and the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688,
695 (1989) (book review) (asserting that Erie was “influenced by legal realism”); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (2006) (asserting that “twenti-
eth-century legal realism led the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins to relinquish its influ-
ence over state law”). But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998) (disputing view that legal positivism was important to
Erie).
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by law and informed by experience.”57  Further, in support of the bill
that would become the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce emphasized:
The work of this commission will be of a most exacting and
difficult character, demanding persons who have experience
in the problems to be met—that is, a proper knowledge of
both the public requirements and the practical affairs of in-
dustry.  It is manifestly desirable that the terms of the com-
missioners shall be long enough to give them an opportunity
to acquire the expertness in dealing with these special ques-
tions concerning industry that comes from experience.58
The expertise claim came straight from the Progressive-techno-
cratic playbook, which called for the separation of politics from eco-
nomic and social administration and the entrustment of
decisionmaking to neutral experts—economic engineers capable of
improving the performance of the market through planning based on
objective scientific principles.59  As Woodrow Wilson famously put it,
regulators would be experts in the “science of administration” that
operated “outside the proper sphere of politics.”60
Justice Sutherland swallowed the final two prongs of his FTC
characterization in a single sentence: “Its duties are neither political
nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legisla-
tive.”61  Because the FTC was not acting as a law enforcer, but instead
as a judge and legislator, the President did not need to control FTC
Commissioners in order to perform his constitutional obligation to see
that the laws were faithfully executed.  Like expertise and indepen-
dence, the idea of administrative agencies blurring the traditionally
Montesquieuan demarcations between the three branches of govern-
ment and commingling executive, legislative, and judicial functions in
order to achieve more efficient decisionmaking was central to
Progressivism.62
57 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm’n, 206 U.S. 441, 451 (1907)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 10–11 (1914)).
59 See WILLIAM E. AKIN, TECHNOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE TECHNOCRAT
MOVEMENT, 1900–1941 ix–xi (1977) (summarizing the rise and fall of the technocratic move-
ment); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7–8 (1938) (arguing for tech-
nocratic-administrative solutions to improve over the laissez-faire economic system).
60 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197, 210 (1887).
61 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624.
62 Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation
of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L. J. 1565, 1591–92 (2011).
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A final piece of important context concerns the company that the
Humphrey’s Executor decision kept.63  The decision was announced
on Roosevelt’s “Black Monday,” May 27, 1935, in the midst of a
sweep of cases in 1935–1936 in which the conservative Supreme Court
waged combat against Roosevelt,64 and on the same day as the
Schechter Poultry65 decision, which invalidated crucial aspects of the
National Industrial Recovery Act on nondelegation and commerce
clause grounds.66  It is striking that this decision, ostensibly reflecting
the “heyday of the progressive model within the judiciary,”67 came
from a predominantly conservative Court intent on reigning in the
power of the New Deal presidency.68  The conventional account has
the Progressive takeover of the Supreme Court beginning in 1937 with
the repudiation of the classical liberal and laissez faire doctrines fa-
vored by the Sutherland wing of the Court,69 so it is odd to think of
Humphrey’s Executor as symbolizing the heart of Progressive-techno-
cratic ideology.  The Humphrey’s Executor decision was unanimous
(as was Schechter Poultry), with McReynolds writing separately only
to point back to his dissenting opinion in Myers,70 which had argued
from a constitutional history standpoint for limitations on the Presi-
dent’s removal power.71  That Justices Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis
joined without comment points to an anticentralization ideological
strand in the decision—the Court’s progressives in 1935 remained
more in the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian camp that feared large aggrega-
tions of power, whether in the private sector or government, than later
New Deal appointees who were more comfortable with the expansion
of the federal government and executive branch power.72
63 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
64 See generally Miller, supra note 6, at 92–94 (discussing context of Humphrey’s Executor R
decision).
65 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66 Id. at 541–42, 550–51.
67 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 100 (1994).
68 See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,
1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 88 (2004).
69 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION
13 (2006).
70 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
71 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 178–239 (1926) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
72 An anecdote recounted by Peter Irons concerning the day of the Schechter Poultry and
Humphrey’s Executor decisions is telling: “Before Tommy Corcoran could depart, a Supreme
Court page tapped him on the shoulder and said that Justice Brandeis would like to see him in
the justices’ robing room.  Brandeis wanted Corcoran to convey a message to the White House:
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Because the coalition that decided Humphrey’s Executor was a
mixed bag of conservative classicists and populist anticentralizational-
ists, it is perhaps best to understand the decision as accidentally or
opportunistically Progressive rather than embodying true-belief Pro-
gressivism.  Nonetheless, the decision articulated the heart of the Pro-
gressive vision for administrative agencies—politically detached and
independent, uniquely expert and objective, and acting through a
combination of political decisional modes, particularly those conven-
tionally associated with legislatures and courts.
B. Presidential Control After Humphrey’s Executor
Despite its symbolic importance as an expression of Progressive-
technocratic values, the importance of Humphrey’s Executor’s four-
prong justification as a matter of constitutional law has eroded over
time for two reasons—one doctrinal and one practical.  The first rea-
son has to do with subsequent doctrinal developments on presidential
control over the removal of officers of the United States.  In subse-
quent cases, the Supreme Court expanded Humphrey’s Executor well
beyond the limited frame presented in the 1935 opinion.
The first important decision was Wiener v. United States,73 a 1958
decision involving President Eisenhower’s removal of a Truman ap-
pointee to the War Claims Commission (“WCC”).74  Unlike the FTC
tenure statute, which limited removal to for cause situations, the WCC
statute was silent on removal.75  Nonetheless, finding the War Claims
Commissioner’s three-year terms to imply protection against political
removal, Justice Frankfurter’s unanimous opinion for the Court held
the President’s removal unlawful.76  The opinion pivoted from
Humphrey’s Executor, which had treated Myers as the background
rule and articulated tailored reasons for departing from it. Wiener
suggested instead that Myers was a “short-lived” and narrow aberra-
tion and that Humphrey’s Executor’s flexible and functional approach
should be understood as the more general rule.77  Only a duo—politi-
cal independence and adjudicatory functions—of the Humphrey’s Ex-
‘This is the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to go back and tell the President
that we’re not going to let this government centralize everything.  It’s come to an end.’” PETER
H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 104 (1982).
73 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
74 Id. at 349–50.
75 Id. at 350.
76 Id. at 350, 356.
77 Id. at 352.
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ecutor quartet made appearances to justify the Commissioner’s tenure
in office.78
Unitary executive proponents saw a glimmer of hope for Myers in
1986 with the Court’s decision in Bowsher v. Synar,79 which held that
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act’s80 delegation of budget-reduction
duties to the Comptroller General, over whom Congress held the re-
moval power, was unconstitutional on separation of powers princi-
ples.81 Myers re-emerged as favored, along with a renewed focus on
the executive character of the removed actor: “Congress cannot re-
serve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the
execution of the laws except by impeachment.”82  But the glimmer was
short-lived, as just two years later in Morrison v. Olson,83 the Court
cast Bowsher as a case about congressional self-aggrandizement rather
than presidential prerogative.84
Morrison, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978,85 cast serious doubt on the continuing relevance of the
Humphrey’s Executor quartet.86  Prosecution is manifestly a core exec-
utive function,87 so the central thrust of Humphrey’s Executor—re-
casting the FTC as something other than a law-enforcement agency—
had to be abandoned.  On the statute’s restriction of the Attorney
General’s power to remove the independent counsel, Justice Rehn-
quist’s opinion explicitly jettisoned the “quasi-legislative, quasi-judi-
cial” criteria:
We undoubtedly did rely on the terms “quasi-legislative” and
“quasi-judicial” to distinguish the officials involved in
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener from those in Myers, but
our present considered view is that the determination of
whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good
78 See id. at 354–55 (discussing the Commissioners’ political independence from the execu-
tive and legislative branches and discussing the Commission’s judicial functions).
79 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
80 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900–907d, 922 (2012)).
81 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
82 Id.
83 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
84 Id. at 685–86.
85 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, and 28 U.S.C.)
86 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–91.
87 See id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[P]rosecution of crimes is a quintessentially execu-
tive function.”).
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cause”-type restriction on the President’s power to remove
an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that
official is classified as “purely executive.”88
Rather than the Humphrey’s Executor quartet, removability anal-
ysis would turn on whether the removal restriction “unduly in-
terfer[es] with the role of the Executive Branch.”89
The Court’s most recent removal decision, PCAOB, renewed uni-
tary executive theorists’ hopes of a Myers revival—indeed, in contra-
distinction to Wiener, which attempted to bury Myers, Justice
Roberts’s opinion in PCAOB refers to Myers as a “landmark case.”90
The 5-4 decision invalidated the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board’s (“PCAOB”) “dual for-cause” limitation, which gave for
cause removal of PCAOB members to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and gave for-cause removal of SEC Commis-
sioners to the president.91  The Court distinguished Humphrey’s Exec-
utor as a case that, unlike Morrison and PCAOB, did not involve
“inferior officers” of the United States.92  The opinion focused on the
multiple layers of protection issue, declined to reconsider Humphrey’s
Executor,93 and left untouched its quartet of rationales.
After the line of cases ending in PCAOB, Humphrey’s Executor
occupies an uncertain position.  Unitary executive advocates hope to
scrap it altogether and find support in Myers, Bowsher, and
PCAOB—whereas advocates of independent agencies have largely
moved on from Humphrey’s Executor’s quartet to the authority of
Wiener and especially Morrison.  As demonstrated by the line of
PCAOB cases, the quartet argument found in Humphrey’s has little
remaining bearing on contemporary discussions of the removal power
as a question of constitutional law.
This Part now turns to the practical reasons as to why the impor-
tance of Humphrey’s four-prong justification has eroded over time.
Beyond doctrinal considerations, a second reason to be skeptical
about the continuing relevance of the Humphrey’s Executor quartet is
the now widely accepted understanding that removal power is less im-
88 Id. at 689 (majority opinion).
89 Id. at 693.
90 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
91 See id. at 486–87.
92 Id. at 493.
93 Id. at 483 (explaining that none of the parties had asked the Court to reconsider Myers,
Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, or United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), and that the
Court would not do so on its own initiative).
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portant in achieving practical control than is often assumed.94  The for-
mal power to fire may be structurally less important to controlling an
agency or department than other mechanisms, such as the power to
appoint members or the chair, budgetary control, or even less formal
mechanisms like ex parte contacts.95  In a recent case study of presi-
dential control over administrative agencies in the financial sector,
Lisa Bressman and Robert Thompson show that the executive branch
exercises considerable influence through such mechanisms as statu-
tory consultation and coordination obligations.96  This strand of schol-
arship suggests that the President has effective tools for influencing
administrative agencies even without the removal power, which di-
minishes the relevance of the direct legal question presented in
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener.
There is a further potential twist on the removal power question
concerning the scope of the remedy for a wrongful removal by the
President.  In the two independent agency cases in which the Supreme
Court held that the Commissioner was wrongfully removed—Wiener
and Humphrey’s Executor—the suit was merely for back pay, not for
reinstatement (which would have been a moot question in
Humphrey’s Executor given the Commissioner’s death).97  The impli-
cation is that a presidential order terminating the commissioner of an
independent agency is effective though unlawful,98 which would sug-
94 See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. R
95 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 469–77 (2008) (showing empirically
that the President exercises weak control over independent agencies through appointment of
members, at least until a majority of commissioners are appointed from the President’s own
party); Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the Solicitor
General, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1087–90 (2009) (focusing on ability of Solicitor General
to shape federal policy before the Supreme Court as an example of a presidential check on
agency independence); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–91 (1984) (suggesting that the Presi-
dent influences agencies through appointment of members and chairs and through assistance
with budgetary negotiations); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 943–44 (1980) (describing President’s
power to influence administrative agencies through informal contacts); see also Rachel E. Bar-
kow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15
(2010) (discussing ways to achieve agency insulation from “interest groups and partisan pres-
sure” other than removal limitations).
96 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 628–33 (2010).
97 Wiener brought a quo warranto action challenging the legality of his removal, but it was
dismissed, and he proceeded to the Supreme Court solely on his back pay claim.  Wiener v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349, 351 n.* (1958).
98 See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 720 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting)
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gest that a President could freely fire independent agency Commis-
sioners of whom he disapproved so long as he was willing to keep
paying their salary—a relatively inconsequential check given the polit-
ical stakes often at issue.
C. Why Reconsideration?  The FTC and Progressivism at One
Hundred
In light of the considerations discussed in the previous Section,
Humphrey’s Executor may be already operationally defunct—the
quartet of justifications no longer fits into contemporary doctrinal and
functional debates over agency independence, and the very question
of the removal power has less efficacy than long assumed.  Nonethe-
less, it is worth revisiting Humphrey’s Executor’s assumptions in light
of the FTC’s historical experience.  Not only is the FTC one hundred
years old, but with the demise of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in 1995,99 the Commission is the sole remaining archetype of the
Progressive-era agency that inspired the alphabet soup of subsequent
New Deal agencies in the 1930s100 and other regulatory agencies in the
second half of the twentieth century.101  Thus, to examine the actual
conduct of the FTC’s first century is to examine the template for the
modern administrative state—to consider its foundational justifica-
tions as endorsed in real time by the judiciary.
Further, Humphrey’s Executor does more than justify insulation
from the presidential removal power.  As Geoffrey Miller has put it,
the decision serves as the “fundamental constitutional charter of the
(discussing possibility of ordering reinstatement of unlawfully discharged naval officer); Aziz Z.
Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 74–76 (2013) (discussing possibility
that exclusive remedy for unlawful termination by President could be back pay).
99 Congress abolished the ICC with the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
100 HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE STATE 423 (2006) (reporting that the FTC served as the model for later indepen-
dent agencies); LANDIS, supra note 59, at 111 (noting “the rise of the independent, regulatory R
administrative agency” due to a “desire to have the fashioning of industrial policy removed to a
degree from political influence,” thereby increasing professionalism and more permanent poli-
cies); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1130–36 (2000) (discussing the impor-
tance of the ICC and FTC in giving “the basic organizational model for the modern multi-mem-
ber independent agency”).
101 Cf. Paul M. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 257–58 (discussing Progressive-era criticisms of independent agencies and the establishment
of new agencies in the 1970s and 1980s).
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independent regulatory commissions.”102  Despite whether the quartet
remains important to the removal question, it succinctly articulates
the Progressive-technocratic vision for market administration through
apolitical experts regulating through legislative and judicial modalities
rather than through the adversarial, individualized method of execu-
tive law enforcement in a common law system.  It is thus relevant—
highly relevant—to ask at the FTC’s centennial anniversary whether
the agency has acted in conformity with Humphrey’s Executor’s
description.  If it has not, then the bedrock Progressive case for inde-
pendent agencies requires reconsideration.
II. HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR DEBUNKED
Before turning to an evaluation of the Humphrey’s Executor
quartet in historical perspective, a word on the historical mission of
the FTC will set the stage.  The FTC Act was one of two 1914 statutes
(the other being the Clayton Act) designed to improve on the Sher-
man Act through simultaneous specificity and generality.  The speci-
ficity came through the Clayton Act’s enhanced precision over the
Sherman Act’s vague prohibitions on contracts in “restraint of trade”
and “monopolizing.”103  Instead of an amorphous rule of reason, there
would be direct prohibitions on anticompetitive price discrimination,
tying, exclusive dealing, mergers, and interlocking directorates.104  But
if the Clayton Act added specificity, the FTC Act went in the opposite
direction with a single organic prohibition on “unfair methods of com-
petition,”105 a phrase even more indefinite and open-textured than the
Sherman Act’s prohibitory language.  The FTC Act’s bite was not in
its prohibition, but in the institution it created to administer the prohi-
bition—the five-member Commission wielding the broad investiga-
tory and equitable powers described in Humphrey’s Executor.106
102 Miller, supra note 6, at 94. R
103 See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
104 See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012)); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459–60 (1922)
(noting the Clayton Act is designed to supplement the Sherman Act, and prohibits contracts or
leases where the effect “‘may’ be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
monopoly”).
105 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
106 The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee’s Report on the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act explained its choice of an open-ended mandate for the FTC as follows:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would
attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce
and to forbid [them] . . . or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning
unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair.
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Following Humphrey’s Executor, in 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Act107
added a new clause to the organic prohibition text of the FTC Act—a
prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or practice.”108  This amend-
ment delegated a new consumer protection mission to the FTC.109  As
such, after 1938, the Commission continued to enforce the antitrust
laws in parallel with the Justice Department but also assumed a com-
pletely separate responsibility for consumer protection, without a dis-
tinct executive department analog until the creation of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau in 2011.110  Hence, the Commission that
Justice Sutherland described in 1935 would soon obtain a new mission,
even while retaining its institutional organization.
This Part will now evaluate each of the elements of the
Humphrey’s quartet based on the past 100 years of experience.  First,
this Part assesses the claim that the FTC is nonpartisan and indepen-
dent from any other branch of government.  Second, this Part ad-
dresses Justice Sutherland’s notion of an FTC structure founded on
expertise.  Third, this Part evaluates whether the FTC has fulfilled its
intended quasi-legislative purpose as a substantive rulemaking agency.
Finally, this Part examines whether the FTC can accurately be de-
scribed as quasi-judicial based on its powers regarding antitrust cases
and its ability to hear matters administratively.
A. Nonpartisan and Politically Independent
The leading edge of the Humphrey’s Executor quartet is the claim
that the FTC is nonpartisan and independent from any other branch
of government.111  As noted earlier, the idea of detached, objective,
neutral administration undergirded the Progressive-technocratic vi-
sion.112  Independent regulatory commissions were to be politics-free
zones.113  Given advances in public choice theory, it is unsurprising
that the nonpolitical independence account does not reflect the FTC’s
It concluded that the latter course would be better, for the reason . . . that there
were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law
it would be quite possible to invent others.
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914).
107 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111.
108 Id.
109 See Milton Handler, The Control of False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 96 (1939).
110 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
111 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
112 See supra Part I.A.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. R
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historical reality.  Although the Commission is operationally indepen-
dent from the President, it has shown itself largely subservient to Con-
gress’s purse strings in important ways.114
That Congress exercises a high degree of control over the FTC is
today largely a given.115  Congress deliberately structured the agency
to be a congressional creature and left no doubt that it intended to
remain in charge.116  As Senator Albert Cummins, a leading backer of
the FTC Act, explained, the FTC was to be “a commission at all times
under the power of Congress” and “always subordinate to Con-
gress.”117  The relevant question is what kind of control Congress exer-
cises over the FTC.  Does Congress control the FTC ideologically by
pushing the FTC to adopt policy positions favored by Congress, or is
the control of a more venial nature with individual congressmen ex-
tracting rents in individual enforcement matters?118
The answer is that both sorts of congressional influence show up
in the historical record.  Empirical work shows that Congress exerts its
influence to control the FTC’s ideological trajectory, to push it in par-
ticular enforcement directions.119  For example, William Kovacic, who
later went on to become the FTC’s chair, found in an empirical study
analyzing FTC enforcement during the 1969–1979 period that the
FTC consistently chose policy programs that followed the expressed
will of the FTC’s oversight committees in Congress, particularly by
embarking on more aggressive enforcement programs in response to
congressional pressure.120
The existence of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)—a parallel
agency in the executive branch with a nearly identical antitrust mis-
sion—provides a convenient natural experiment to gauge the magni-
114 William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J.
869, 881–88 (1988) [hereinafter Kovacic, Congress]; Kovacic, supra note 34; Roger L. Faith et al., R
Antitrust Pork Barrel, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 34. R
115 See supra note 114. R
116 See supra note 114. R
117 51 CONG. REC. 13,047–48 (1914).
118 See Kovacic, Congress, supra note 114, at 881–88 (contrasting three understandings of R
Congressional control over the FTC: (1) principal-agent model: close control, (2) principal-agent
model: loose control, and (3) rent-seeking model).
119 Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 788, 792
(1983). But see Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Domi-
nance,’ 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475, 476–77 (1987) (criticizing Weingast & Moran study); Timothy J.
Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884, 884–89 (1986) (same).
120 Kovacic, supra note 34, at 63–65, 82–86, 89–93. R
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tude of the difference in effects of presidential or congressional
control.121  Particularly during periods of divided government when
the White House and the House of Representatives have been con-
trolled by different parties, the two agencies have clashed along ideo-
logical lines.122  The clearest example occurred during the last two
years of President George W. Bush’s administration, when a snub by
the Justice Department in 2005 set up an aggressive FTC counterof-
fensive following the 2006 Democratic takeover of the House.123  The
FTC lost an enforcement action against Schering-Plough over phar-
maceutical “reverse payment” settlements in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit124 and sought a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court.125  The Solicitor General and the Antitrust Division
then filed their own brief recommending that the Court deny certio-
rari,126 which the Court did.127  Following the 2006 Democratic take-
over of the House, the FTC struck back.  In 2007, in a private lawsuit,
the Ninth Circuit ruled for the plaintiff on a “price squeezing” issue128
and in response the Solicitor General and the Antitrust Division filed
an amicus curiae brief supporting the defendant’s certiorari petition in
the Supreme Court.129  The FTC then issued a lengthy press release
explaining that it strongly disagreed with the Justice Department and
refused to join the brief.130  A year later, the FTC refused to join a
report on unilateral exclusionary conduct that the agencies had been
working on jointly for several years.131  Instead, the FTC issued a
harshly worded dissent, complaining that the report “would be a
121 See William J. Kolasky, Jr. & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal
Trade Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 911
(1997) (describing the DOJ and the FTC as parallel agencies).
122 See id. (discussing effect of divided government on DOJ and FTC enforcement).
123 See infra notes 124–32 and accompanying text. R
124 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005).
125 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No.
05-273), 2005 WL 2105243.
126 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S.
919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2006 WL 1358441.
127 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
128 linkLine Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2007).
129 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns,
Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (No. 07-512), 2008 WL 2155265.
130 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PETI-
TION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, Pacific Tel. Co. d/b/a AT&T California v. linkLine Comms.,
Inc. (No. 07-512) (2008), http://www.appliedantitrust.com/17_predation/case_studies/linkline/
linkline_cert/ftc_statement.pdf.
131 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2009/05/11/236681.pdf.
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blueprint for radically weakened enforcement of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act” and threatening that the FTC “stands ready to fill any
Sherman Act enforcement void that might be created if the Depart-
ment actually implements the policy decisions expressed in its
Report.”132
Although overall enforcement trends at the two agencies have
moved in parallel,133 the FTC and DOJ have not been shy about ex-
pressing sharp differences of opinion, even during periods of unified
government.134  In the leading instances of intra-agency public dispute
during periods of unified Democratic government, the FTC has al-
most always taken the more aggressively pro-enforcement position,135
consistent with House of Representatives’ greater tendency toward
populism.  Similarly, during periods when Republicans controlled the
White House and Democrats the House of Representatives, the FTC
clashed with the Justice Department over the Commission’s advocacy
of more aggressive antitrust norms.136
Evidence that the FTC is responsive to the overall ideological will
of Congress is hardly damning and may be democracy-enhancing, but
it does contravene the Humphrey’s Executive objective independence
narrative.137  The FTC’s independence from the President is bought at
the price of dependence on Congress.138  This may contribute to
checks and balances as between the executive and legislative
branches, but it does not create a politically independent agency of the
kind posited in the Progressive-technocratic narrative.
132 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice
Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
(Sept. 8, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftc-commissioners-react-
department-justice-report-competition-and (quoting statement of Commissioners Harbour,
Leibowitz, and Rosch).
133 See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
36–37 (2011) (discussing statistical data on FTC and DOJ enforcement trends).
134 Examples of public disagreement between the agencies during periods when the Demo-
crats controlled both the White House and Congress include a 1963 disagreement between the
agencies on cooperative price advertising and the application of functional discounts to coopera-
tive buying groups. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-699, at 25–32 (1963) (appendix reprinting dueling
opinion letters and statements from FTC and DOJ officials).
135 See A. Everette MacIntyre, The Status of Regulatory Independence, 29 FED. B.J. 1, 8–9
(1968); see also supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text. R
136 See Frederick M. Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission’s Administration of the Anti-
Price Discrimination Law—A Paradox of Antitrust Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 422–23
(1964) (discussing FTC proposals—opposed by Justice Department—for legislative narrowing of
the Robinson-Patman Act’s meeting competition defense); see also supra notes 124–32 and ac- R
companying text.
137 See MacIntyre, supra note 135, at 19–20. R
138 See id. at 7, 19.
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The second type of congressional control—rent-seeking by partic-
ular congressmen—is also documented in the political science litera-
ture and is more troubling.  In a broad empirical study, Roger Faith,
Donald Leavens, and Robert Tollison found that case dismissals at the
FTC were nonrandomly concentrated on defendants headquartered in
the home districts of congressmen on committees and subcommittees
with budgetary and oversight jurisdiction over the FTC, suggesting
that influential congressmen leveraged their budgetary power over the
FTC to shield powerful constituents from enforcement actions.139  In
contrast, particularly after Watergate and the scandal over presiden-
tial meddling in law enforcement, antitrust enforcement by the Justice
Department became highly independent from White House control.140
In sum, Humphrey’s Executor may have it exactly backwards, at
least as the facts appear at the FTC’s centennial anniversary.  Con-
gressional influence over FTC enforcement decisions may create a
greater opportunity for crony-capitalism and political influence ped-
dling than exists at the Antitrust Division.  At a minimum, the claims
of apolitical independence are historically unfounded.  The FTC has
become the creature of Congress, just as its founders predicted.141
B. Uniquely Expert
Expertise is the second instrument in the Humphrey’s Executor
quartet.  Consistent with Progressive belief in administration by the
best and brightest of scientific experts, Justice Sutherland described an
FTC structure founded on expertise.142  The relationship between in-
dependence and expertise is captured in the Court’s suggestion that
independence was necessary to attract the best experts and that the
Commissioners’ seven-year term, which required separation from the
four-year presidential cycle, would allow the Commissioners to gain
additional expertise through experience in office.143
139 Faith et al., supra note 114, at 19, 22, 26. R
140 See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1172–74 (2008)
(describing a dramatic shift in presidential involvement in antitrust enforcement pre- and post-
Watergate).
141 51 CONG. REC. 8857 (1914) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (“[I]t is unsafe for an adminis-
tration in power, an administrative officer representing a great political party, to hold the power
of life and death over the great business interests of this country . . . . Whatever we do in regulat-
ing business should be removed as far as possible from political influence.”).
142 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (citing S. REP. NO. 63-597,
at 10–11 (1914)).
143 See id.
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In order for expertise to have purchase as a justification for inde-
pendence, a comparative assessment must be made with executive
branch agencies.  Expertise can only justify independence if the com-
mission model allows the agency to attract, retain, or deploy experts
more advantageously than a purely executive branch agency under the
control of the President.  The historical record shows that the FTC
cannot claim any historical expertise advantage over its closest execu-
tive branch analog—the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division—ex-
cept in particular market sectors, where the expertise comes from the
FTC’s historical experience based on an informal market-division ar-
rangement with the Antitrust Division.144
Historically, FTC Commissioners have not been leading experts
in their fields when appointed and have not stayed at the Commission
long enough to acquire expertise.145  Bill Kovacic’s comprehensive
study of the FTC Commissioners over time found a striking “paucity”
in the quality of the appointments.146  Kovacic found that only a hand-
ful of appointees to the FTC had distinguished experience or training
in competition or consumer protection.147  By contrast, the list of for-
mer Assistant Attorneys General for the Antitrust Division boasts a
plethora of distinguished names including Justice Robert Jackson,
Judge Thurman Arnold, Donald Turner, William Baxter, Judge Doug-
las Ginsburg, and many other leading antitrust professionals and aca-
demics, as well as other distinguished jurists, such as Stephen Breyer
and Michael Boudin, who served in other top posts in the Antitrust
Division.148  If the question is whether the political appointments to
the “technocratic” FTC or the “political” DOJ have been more distin-
guished, at least until recent years, the DOJ clearly comes out ahead.
Moving beyond the Commissioner level, it has also not been the
case that the FTC has held any lasting expertise advantage in its staff
in the discipline where expertise should matter the most to the
agency—economics.  When the FTC came into being in 1914, it inher-
ited the Economic Department (later transformed into the Economic
Division and then the Bureau of Economics) of its predecessor—the
144 See The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
145 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 761, 768 (2005).
146 William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal
Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 917 (1997).
147 Id. at 916–17.
148 Justice Breyer served as special assistant to the Assistant Attorney General from
1965–67.
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Bureau of Corporations.149  The Antitrust Division did not hire its first
economist or create an economics unit until 1936.150  Until the early
1970s, economists played a relatively small role in the division—
mostly in data gathering and statistical litigation support.151  The
FTC’s economics unit, by contrast, enjoyed earlier influence within
the agency.152  Today, however, there is little distinction between the
agencies on this score.  At the Antitrust Division, a deputy assistant
attorney general for economics—usually a prominent academic econ-
omist—heads a staff of approximately sixty Ph.D.-level economists.153
At the FTC, the Bureau of Economics features about seventy Ph.D.
level economists (although they spend about a quarter of their time on
consumer protection issues).154  The Bureau Director is also usually a
prominent academic economist, and there is sometimes an economist
among the Commissioners.155  In sum, while there was a period of
time when the FTC enjoyed an expertise advantage over the Justice
Department in economics, that advantage had nothing to do with the
FTC’s independent agency model, and the advantage soon
dissipated.156
The one kind of unique expertise the FTC may claim is expertise
in particular industries.  The agencies have historically divided up the
cases they bring based on their prior work with particular markets.157
Thus, for example, the FTC has considerable experience with
pharmaceuticals and health care, and the Antitrust Division has con-
siderable experience with airlines and computer software.158  Again,
however, that comparative expertise is not a product of the agency
model, but of the need to accomplish a rational workload division
given agency duplication.  If the FTC were folded into the Antitrust
Division, that expertise would not disappear.  Further, if we are sim-
ply tallying “expertise points” between the FTC and Justice Depart-
ment, for every line of FTC industry-specific expertise there is an
149 Lawrence J. White, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust:
An Extended Discussion 9 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-07, 2008).
150 R. Hewitt Pate, Tribute, Robert H. Jackson at the Antitrust Division, 68 ALB. L. REV.
787, 791 n.12 (2005).
151 White, supra note 149, at 10–11. R
152 Id. at 10.
153 Id. at 11, 13.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 11.
156 See id.
157 See Crane, supra note 140, at 1198–99. R
158 See id. at 1199.
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equal and opposite industry-specific expertise at the Antitrust
Division.159
In sum, the FTC’s experience in its first century gives no reason
to believe that expertise is an advantage of the independent commis-
sion model.  If anything, the Justice Department has been more suc-
cessful in attracting distinguished figures as leaders and has, for at
least the last three or four decades, enjoyed an equivalent level of
economic expertise at the staff level.
C. Quasi-Legislative
The assertion in Humphrey’s Executor that the FTC has a “quasi-
legislative” character springs from Progressive-era ambitions that the
FTC could address competition problems through a regulatory ap-
proach rather than through conventional prosecutorial litigation.160
Much of the impetus behind the FTC Act was Progressive frustration
with the sedulous pace, fact specificity, and conservative character of
antitrust litigation in the federal courts.  For example, President
Woodrow Wilson’s January 20, 1914 message to Congress on antitrust
legislation—the presidential precursor to the passage of the FTC
Act—asserted that a federal trade commission could provide clear
rules and direction for business that courts had been incapable of pro-
viding.161  Consistent with Progressive values, the FTC would serve as
an indispensable instrument of information and publicity, as a
clearinghouse for the facts by which both the public mind and the
managers of great business undertakings should be guided.  The FTC
would also serve as an instrumentality for doing justice to business
where the processes of the courts or the natural forces of correction
outside the courts were inadequate to adjust the remedy to the wrong
in a way that would meet all the equities and circumstances of the
case.162
159 See id. (discussing division of expertise between FTC and Justice Department).
160 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 628 (1935) (describing the
FTC as a “quasi-legislative” body); see also MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUC-
TION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 325–26 (1988).
161 See President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Trusts and
Monopolies, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 20, 1914), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=65374 (“And the business men of the country desire something more than that the menace
of legal process in these matters be made explicit and intelligible.  They desire the advice, the
definite guidance and information which can be supplied by an administrative body, an interstate
trade commission.”).
162 Id.  See generally SKLAR, supra note 160, at 325–27. R
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The 1914 statute gave the FTC the authority to “make rules and
regulations for the purpose of carrying out the [FTC Act’s] provi-
sions,”163 but it remained unsettled until 1973 whether this general
provision applied only to procedural or noninvestigatory rulemaking,
or whether it also applied to substantive rules fleshing out the open-
ended prohibition of Section 5 of the FTC Act.164  In 1973, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Section 46(g) gave the
FTC the power to promulgate trade regulation rules with the effect of
substantive law.165  Two years later, the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975
(“Magnuson-Moss”)166 gave the FTC the power to frame substantive
trade regulation rules in furtherance of its consumer protection mis-
sion, although with heightened notice and comment procedural
requirements.167
Despite the Progressive ambitions for an actively legislative
agency and eventual affirmation by the federal courts of its substan-
tive rulemaking power, the FTC’s substantive rulemaking activity has
been quite limited.168  For its first forty-nine years, until the passage of
Magnuson-Moss, the FTC issued a few rules mostly related to dis-
crete, industry-specific statutory grants of rulemaking authority under
such statutes as the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939,169 the Fur
Products Labeling Act of 1951,170 and the Textile Fiber Products Iden-
tification Act of 1958.171  It promulgated few substantive rules related
to its core mission under Section 5 of the FTC Act.172  Following
Magnuson-Moss, the FTC embarked on a temporary surge of
163 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (2012).
164 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 551–55 (2002).
165 Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 673, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
166 Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)).
167 See id.
168 The FTC may issue both substantive rules and those controlling procedural matters
internal to the agency. See FTC OPERATING MANUAL ch. 7, http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch07rulemaking.pdf.
169 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, ch. 871, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 68 (2012)); 16 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2015).
170 Fur Products Labeling Act, ch. 298, 65 Stat. 175 (1951) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 69 (2012)); 16 C.F.R. pt. 301 (2015).
171 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, Pub. L. No. 85-897, 72 Stat. 1717 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 70 (2012)); 16 C.F.R. pt. 303 (2014).
172 See Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC’s Consumer Protection Program During the Miller
Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 371,
415–16 (1997) (noting the “trivial” rules made before Magnuson-Moss).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN601.txt unknown Seq: 27 23-DEC-15 15:53
2015] DEBUNKING HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR 1861
rulemaking activity regarding consumer protection, but continued to
ignore completely its power to pass substantive antitrust rules.173
The antitrust side is arguably more relevant when evaluating the
assertions made in Humphrey’s Executor, because the FTC only had
antitrust powers at the time the case was decided and would not re-
ceive its consumer protection mandate until the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ments three years later.174  Over the course of its first century, the
FTC promulgated exactly one substantive antitrust rule (in 1968),175
which it apparently never enforced.176  In its original capacity and only
capacity at the time of Humphrey’s Executor, the FTC has not been
quasi-legislative at all.
The reason for the FTC’s failure to live up to its rulemaking as-
signment may be that antitrust simply does not lend itself to rulemak-
ing of this kind.  During the 1970s, administrative law maven Kenneth
Culp Davis argued that the FTC’s primary institutional advantage was
its power to promulgate rules.177  During that period, the FTC
searched earnestly for practices to regulate, considering such candi-
dates as delivered pricing in the cement industry, shopping center
lease restrictions, physician influence over health insurance payments,
and mergers affecting potential competition.178  Despite its desire to
regulate by rule, the FTC found no plausible candidates.  Then the
antitrust establishment hammered a nail into the coffin by weighing in
against antitrust rulemaking.  A 1989 American Bar Association
(“ABA”) report on the FTC—which included the participation of the
eminent administrative law scholar Cass Sunstein—concluded, “We
173 See id. at 416–17 (noting that the FTC used its rulemaking ability to address unfair and
deceptive practices, not antitrust).
174 See Ira M. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 439, 453–54 (1964).
175 Discriminatory Practices in Men’s and Boys’ Tailored Clothing Industry, 16 C.F.R. pt.
412 (1968); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 678 (2009).  Max Huffman
argues that the FTC’s petroleum market manipulation rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 317 (2015), promul-
gated in November 2009, could also be understood in part as an antitrust rule.  Max Huffman,
Gen Next Antitrust?  Reviewing Daniel Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG 1, 3 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201067.
176 Royce Zeisler, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should Use
Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 266, 281.
177 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 70–74
(1969).
178 Larry Lempert, FTC Rulemaking Not Beginning of Deluge, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Apr.
30, 1979, at 1, 7; FTC Staff Narrows Rulemaking to Three Areas, [July–Dec.] Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 884, at A-13 (Oct. 12, 1978).
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are not optimistic about the chances that the FTC could codify anti-
trust-oriented prohibitions on specific types of business conduct.”179
On the consumer protection side, the FTC has been more active
in rulemaking, although with important qualifications.  The FTC has
issued twenty rules pursuant to specific Acts of Congress authorizing
the FTC to regulate particular industries or practices, such as the sale
of wool products or automotive fuel ratings.180  These include some of
its most popularly known rules, such as the Do-Not-Call Registry
Rule181 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.182  It has
also promulgated a batch of rules concerning the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act, also pursuant to a specific delegation from Congress.183  The
FTC has promulgated only sixteen trade regulation rules—rules de-
signed to implement the agency’s core organic mission to prevent de-
ceptive and unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition.
Six of these rules were promulgated from 1965 to 1979,184 including
five during the 1970s, a period that corresponded with the passage of
Magnuson-Moss and optimism that the FTC could address broad
swaths of the consumer protection landscape through regulation.185  In
the late 1970s, the FTC’s rulemaking agenda suffered a serious set-
back as the ordinarily friendly Washington Post labeled the agency the
“national nanny”186—a cruel label that stuck—over a series of pro-
posed consumer protection rules, culminating in its proposed “kidvid”
rules relating to advertising to children.187  As political will turned
179 Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to
Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 91 n.103 (1989).
180 See 16 C.F.R. subchapter C (2015).
181 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 (2015) (implementing Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108 (2012)).
182 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2015) (implementing
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)).
183 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.4, 313.16 (2015).
184 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 16 C.F.R. pt. 408 (1965); Deceptive Advertising as to Sizes of Viewable
Pictures Shown by Television Receiving Sets, 16 C.F.R. pt. 410 (1971); Use of Prenotification
Negative Option Plans, 16 C.F.R. pt. 425 (1973); Power Output Claims for Amplifiers Utilized in
Home Entertainment Products, 16 C.F.R. pt. 432 (1975); Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and
Defenses, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (1977); Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 16 C.F.R. pt.
460 (1979).
185 Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2301–2312 (2012)).
186 Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.
187 Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (Apr. 27, 1978); see also J. Howard Beales
III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that Advises the Present, 12
GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 878–79 (2004).
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sharply against the kidvid rules, the FTC was forced to back down.188
Following the kidvid debacle, the pace of trade regulation rulemaking
slowed.  The FTC promulgated four rules during the 1980s,189 three
rules during the 1990s,190 and only three rules since 2000.191
In sum, the report card on the FTC as a “quasi-legislative” body
is historically a mixed bag, with the bottom line that the FTC’s
rulemaking character has been considerably weaker than the Court
suggested in 1935.  As for the antitrust side of things—which currently
makes up about half of the Commission’s activity and its only man-
date at the time of Humphrey’s Executor—the quasi-legislative claim
has no historical support at all.  The FTC proceeds through adjudica-
tion only (although, as this Essay demonstrates next, not primarily
through agency adjudication).  The FTC has been most active as a
rulemaking authority when Congress passes tailored legislation di-
recting the FTC to pass rules on a particular topic, such as telemarket-
ing practices, although even that activity has amounted to only one
rule for every five years of the FTC’s first century.  On consumer pro-
tection, the FTC had a spurt of activity in the 1970s, but trade regula-
tion rulemaking slowed after the kidvid debacle and the trend line has
been down ever since.  Long periods pass—entire Commissions come
and go—without new trade regulation rulemaking.  Finally, claims
about the FTC’s quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial character need to
be evaluated in the context of the Commission’s overall character,
which has increasingly become that of a conventional law enforcement
department.
D. Quasi-Judicial
When the Humphrey’s Executor Court described the FTC as
“quasi-judicial,” it likely had in mind two different aspects of the
Commission’s powers.  The first, which it alluded to early in the opin-
ion,192 is Section 7 of the FTC Act, which allows district courts to refer
188 Beales, supra note 187, at 879–80 (describing termination of rulemaking by FTC in re- R
sponse to political pressure).
189 Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 16 C.F.R. pt. 423 (1983); Credit Practices, 16
C.F.R. pt. 444 (1985); Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 455 (1985);
Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. pt. 424 (1989).
190 Ophthalmic Practice Rules, 16 C.F.R. pt. 456 (1992); Funeral Industry Practices, 16
C.F.R. pt. 453 (1994); Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (1995).
191 Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Op-
portunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. pt. 436 (2007); Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise, 16 C.F.R.
pt. 435 (2011); Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Business Opportunities,
16 C.F.R. pt. 437 (2011).
192 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 621 (1935).
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Department of Justice antitrust cases to the FTC to sit as a “master in
chancery” and determine the appropriate form of relief.193  Several re-
lated powers, alluded to more indirectly early in the opinion,194 in-
clude Section 6(c), which calls for the FTC to monitor compliance
with antitrust decrees obtained by the Justice Department,195 and Sec-
tion 6(e), which allows the Attorney General to request that the FTC
“make recommendations for the readjustment of the business of any
corporation alleged to be violating the antitrust Acts in order that the
corporation may thereafter maintain its organization, management,
and conduct of business in accordance with law.”196
While these chancery-like powers make the FTC “quasi-judicial”
in theory, practice has been entirely different.  The powers simply
have not been used, largely because the FTC and Justice Department
have become rival enforcement agencies that have little interest in
ceding power to one another.  Indeed, the only instance of the use of
the equity power of which this Author is aware is a 1962 letter to the
chairman of the FTC, referring a decree matter to the FTC under Sec-
tion 6(c), in which the Attorney General stated that the section had
been “virtually unused since its enactment in 1914.”197  To this Au-
thor’s knowledge, that power has been unused again since that time.
The FTC’s other “quasi-judicial” capacity concerns its power to
hear matters administratively.  Under its original statutory mandate,
which was still in place at the time of Humphrey’s Executor, the FTC
had no power to sue in federal district court.198  It could bring only
administrative actions and then seek to have those orders enforced by
a court of appeals.199  Conversely, defendants who lost before the Fed-
eral Trade Commission could seek vacatur of the Commission’s order
in a Court of Appeals.200  The Humphrey’s Executor Court was thus
correct in observing that the FTC wielded quasi-judicial powers in
principle.
Legislative changes within three years of the Humphrey’s Execu-
tor decision began a trend that gradually reduced the FTC’s adjudica-
tory character significantly.  The Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938
granted the FTC new powers to act as a party-litigant in federal dis-
193 15 U.S.C. § 47 (2012).
194 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 621.
195 15 U.S.C. § 46(c).
196 Id. § 46(e).
197 United States v. Int’l Nickel Co. of Can., 203 F. Supp. 739, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
198 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (1914).
199 Id.
200 Id.
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trict court.201  The thrust of the FTC’s new power under Section 13
was to seek a preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo pend-
ing the filing of an administrative complaint.202  Thus, a preliminary
injunction obtained under Section 13 dissolves automatically if, within
the time specified by the district court (not to exceed twenty days), the
FTC fails to file an administrative complaint.203  Writing immediately
in the wake of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, the eminent trade
scholar Milton Handler believed that, although the statutory language
was unclear, “an injunction can not be sought independently of a pro-
ceeding by the Commission.”204  In time, however, the FTC would ob-
tain new statutory authority to seek injunctions without going through
administrative proceedings at all.  In 1973, Section 13 was amended to
add a proviso that, with time, would become the rule rather than the
exception: “[I]n proper cases the Commission may seek, and after
proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.”205  Even-
tually, the courts interpreted the language of Section 13(b) to permit a
district court to grant a permanent injunction even though the Com-
mission never brought an administrative action.206
Two years later, in 1975, Congress granted the FTC additional
powers to seek monetary relief, primarily for consumer protection vi-
olations.207  The Commission could seek consumer redress in federal
court for “dishonest or fraudulent” practices, but only after an admin-
istrative proceeding.208  As detailed in a recent article by Howard
Beales and Tim Muris, however, the Commission soon fell into the
habit of obtaining effective monetary relief without administrative ac-
tion by suing in federal district court seeking asset freezes and
mandatory injunctions requiring the defendant to return assets to de-
frauded consumers.209  This use of the federal courts’ injunctive power
201 15 U.S.C. § 53(a).
202 Id. § 53(b).
203 Id. § 53(b).
204 Handler, supra note 109, at 106. R
205 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
206 United States v. JS & A Group, Inc., 716 F.2d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e hold that
section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the Commission to seek, in a proper case, and the court
to grant, after proper proof, permanent injunctive relief, irrespective of whether a Commission
proceeding regarding the alleged violations is pending or contemplated.”); FTC v. H.N. Singer,
Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nat’l Dynamics Corp., 525 F. Supp.
380, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
207 15 U.S.C § 57b; see also J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking the Proper
Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1–2 (2013) (detailing
the events leading up to the 1975 amendments to the FTC Act).
208 15 U.S.C § 57b(a).
209 Beales & Muris, supra note 207, 3. R
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became known as the “Section 13(b) Fraud Program.”210  In combina-
tion with other institutional pressures and strategic considerations, it
had the effect over time of shifting the FTC’s enforcement activities in
the consumer protection field from internal adjudication to executive
enforcement in federal district court.211
The FTC began to face other incentives, beyond the power to
recover monetary penalties, to sue in district court rather than pro-
ceed administratively.  On the one hand, the FTC staff’s adjudicatory
success rate was very high when it proceeded through administrative
adjudication.  For example, a study by Doug Melamed found that, be-
tween 1983 and 2008, the staff won all sixteen antitrust cases adjudi-
cated before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on review by the
Commission.212  But proceeding through agency adjudication resulting
in a perceived rubber stamp by the Commission may have created
disadvantages at the appellate level.  Since 1973, the FTC’s appellate
success rate has been considerably higher in actions initiated in district
court than in actions adjudicated before the agency; in cases decided
on the merits, it has lost on appeal in twenty-eight percent of the cases
that originated in an adjudicatory proceeding in the Commission and
in only seven percent of the cases that originated in the district
court.213  This may suggest that appellate courts are more likely to rule
in favor of the FTC when there is a genuine adjudicatory contest in
district court than when the outcome of adjudicatory effort in the
agency appears to be a foregone conclusion.
An additional factor pushing the FTC toward litigation in district
court rather than agency adjudication is the odd appellate review stat-
ute that allows a defendant who loses before the FTC to lodge its
appeal in essentially any of the appellate federal circuits where the
case could have been brought originally.214  The upshot is that, in cases
adjudicated before the FTC, defendants have an opportunity for
highly effective forum shopping.  For example, when the FTC sued
pharmaceutical companies over “pay for delay” patent settlements,
210 Id.
211 Id. at 4 (describing the increasing use of the Section 13(b) Fraud Program and increas-
ing amount of redress ordered); id. at 22 (explaining that FTC could have accomplished asset
freezes in the district court and then returned to the administrative forum, but there was little
reason to use such a clunky procedure).
212 A. Douglas Melamed, The Wisdom of Using the “Unfair Method of Competition” Prong
of Section 5, GLOBAL COMPETITION POL’Y, Nov. 2008, at 1, 16–17.  The study Melamed cites
found that the respondents won four of the sixteen cases before the administrative law judge, but
then lost those cases before the Commission. Id. at 17.
213 A list of relevant appellate cases appears in the Appendix.
214 See Crane, supra note 133, at 133. R
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN601.txt unknown Seq: 33 23-DEC-15 15:53
2015] DEBUNKING HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR 1867
the defendants were able to appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which had
previously announced a pro-defendant rule in private litigation.215  In
order to avoid this forum shopping, the FTC began to bring its patent
settlement cases in federal district court where the defendants could
not forum shop for a favorable appellate jurisdiction.216
For all of these reasons, and perhaps others, agency adjudication
has become a smaller part of the FTC’s work in recent decades.  In
order to test the incidence of the FTC’s adjudicatory effort, this Au-
thor conducted a review of all FTC enforcement actions from 1996 to
the present.217  Jennifer Fischell, this Author’s research assistant,
hand-coded 2,092 enforcement actions (1,600 consumer protection
cases and 492 antitrust cases) during this period.  This Author and Ms.
Fischell categorized each of these cases into one of three categories.
First, a case could involve no adjudication at all—meaning that either
a court or the agency enters a consent decree without a impartial deci-
sionmaker doing anything at all of an adjudicatory character.  Second,
a case could involve adjudication within the agency.  Finally, a case
could involve adjudication in federal district court.  Cases were coded
as involving adjudication—whether in court or in the agency—if the
docket showed any indication that a judge (whether Article III or
ALJ) was called on to make any sort of adjudicatory decision, even as
simple as entering a scheduling order or a default judgment.  Most
such cases eventually end up in a consent decree, but we nonetheless
coded them as adjudicatory because our effort was to identify any pos-
itive instances of adjudicatory activity.
Overall, this research indicated that 1,183 cases proceeded in fed-
eral court and 909 before the agency.  In total, 1,524 cases ended in
consent degrees without any adjudicatory activity at all, whether in
court or before the agency, and 475 cases saw adjudicatory activity in
federal district court.  Over the eighteen-year period studied, only 79
cases of agency adjudication were identified—just over four a year.
In sum, adjudication is a vanishingly small aspect of what the
FTC does.  The Commission does not serve the adjudicatory function
of a special master in equity, as designed by Congress, at all.  It partic-
ipates in agency adjudication in only a small fraction of its overall wor-
kload.  Far more often, it either enters into consent decrees requiring
215 Id. at 134–35.
216 Id.
217 1996 was chosen out of convenience.  It is the beginning date for the online case
database maintained on the Commission website.  The concluding date for our study was Sep-
tember 1, 2014.
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no adjudication or litigates in federal district court in an executive law
enforcement style—just as the Justice Department or traditional law
enforcement agencies or institutions do.
III. THE COMMISSION’S PREDOMINANTLY EXECUTIVE CHARACTER
With the benefit of a century of experience, some broad conclu-
sions can now be drawn about FTC’s predominant character as an
institution.  The Humphrey’s Executor Court articulated a vision of
the FTC drawn largely from statutory design and Progressive-techno-
cratic aspiration.218  On paper, the agency does look independent, ex-
pert, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial.  But its actual behavior has
generally tended away from those qualities.219  Though independent
from the President, the Commission has been quite evidently respon-
sive to the will of Congress.220  While certainly expert in many ways,
the agency’s expertise has not arisen from structural features of the
Commission model.221  Instead, it has obtained the expertise of any
department—executive or administrative—given sufficient resources
and tasked with doing a job for long enough.  Legislative activity, in
the sense of rulemaking, has not been an aspect of its original and
continuing antitrust mission at all, and only a sporadic aspect of its
consumer protection mission.222  Finally, the Commission has increas-
ingly turned its back on agency adjudication, preferring instead to
enter into consent decrees or litigate in an executive style in federal
district court.223  At a rate of four internally adjudicated cases per
year—many of which involve only the early stages of adjudication
before they are settled through consent decree—adjudication can
hardly be said to be a significant part of the Commission’s continuing
portfolio of activities.224
The predominant character of the agency has become that of a
traditional law enforcement department.  This is most apparent on the
antitrust side, where the Commission does no rulemaking and little
adjudication, essentially dividing enforcement responsibility with the
Justice Department based on superior expertise and prior experience,
and participates with the Justice Department in promulgating guide-
lines spelling out the agencies’ joint perspective on a variety of en-
218 See generally Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
219 See supra Parts II.A–D.
220 See supra Part II.A.
221 See supra Part II.B.
222 See supra Part II.C.
223 See supra Part II.D.
224 See supra Part II.D.
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forcement topics.225  Apart from the FTC’s arguable advantage in
securing preliminary injunctions to block mergers,226 the occasional
case proceeding to litigation before an ALJ, and the DOJ’s monopoly
over criminal enforcement, the two agencies basically do the same
thing—promulgate guidelines, investigate, threaten suit, enter into
consent decrees, and in rare cases, litigate.  In antitrust, the Commis-
sion is for all intents and purposes a traditional law enforcement
agency.
The consumer protection side is somewhat more complicated be-
cause of the presence of some rulemaking activity and, at least until
the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Board, no obvious
executive agency analogue.  Still, even on the consumer protection
side, the agency’s predominant character is executive, with an increas-
ing amount of the Commission’s effort dedicated to consent decrees
and federal district court enforcement where monetary remedies and
their equivalent through injunctive relief are available.227  As a com-
posite of its two functions, the FTC is very far from the quartet of
qualities announced in Humphrey’s Executor.
The Commission’s de facto nondistinctiveness from executive en-
forcement has had important implications for the agency’s position in
the legal landscape.  It shows up in particular when the FTC demands
the privileges of being the sort of institution described in Humphrey’s
Executor—and the legal community raises a skeptical eyebrow.  Take,
for instance, the ongoing question whether the FTC has powers to
condemn as illegal under Section 5 unfair methods of competition that
would not be illegal under the Sherman Act.228  Commentators have
pointed out the difficulties inherent in giving the FTC enforcement
powers beyond those available to the Justice Department, as that
could entail differential treatment of similarly situated firms in differ-
ent industries.229  More fundamentally, one can wonder why the FTC
should have enforcement powers greater than the DOJ when the two
agencies perform essentially the same law enforcement function.  The
case for an independent Section 5 is strongest if the FTC is going to
225 See supra Parts II.B–D.
226 See Crane, supra note 133, at 41. R
227 See supra Part II.D.
228 Crane, supra note 133, at 135–36. R
229 See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 100 is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s
Next 100 Years, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2014) (“[W]hen we rely on Section 5, which
only the FTC enforces, rather than the antitrust laws, which both the FTC and the Justice De-
partment enforce, we risk creating two different standards for patent holders depending on
which agency happens to review the alleged misconduct.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN601.txt unknown Seq: 36 23-DEC-15 15:53
1870 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1835
behave like the technocratic rulemaking and adjudicatory agency the
Supreme Court thought it was in 1935.  It is considerably weaker if the
agency is essentially just another law enforcement agency.
By the same token, the possibility that the FTC’s antitrust posi-
tions on the meaning of Section 5 would be eligible for Chevron defer-
ence is weakened given the Commission’s de facto transformation into
a law enforcement agency.230  Courts do not generally afford Chevron
deference if two different agencies are assigned to enforce the same
statute,231 which is the functional status quo with respect to antitrust
enforcement.
The questions raised by the Commission’s de facto law enforce-
ment character are many.  Should Humphrey’s Executor itself be re-
considered, as Judge Kavanaugh urged232 and some on the Supreme
Court would probably favor?  Should the President obtain plenary po-
litical control over the Commission in order to harmonize antitrust
enforcement between the two agencies?  Should the FTC “right the
ship” and work to become the agency it was ostensibly created to be—
for example, by taking seriously the possibility of rulemaking in anti-
trust, relying more on internal agency adjudication, and offering itself
as a chancellor in equity?233  Should the entire antitrust enforcement
mission of the FTC be transferred to the Justice Department, as urged
by three members of the Antitrust Modernization Commission,234
given the fungibility of the two agencies’ antitrust functions?
At a minimum, the historical record needs to be set straight.  The
FTC bears little resemblance to the Progressive-technocratic vision
enunciated in Humphrey’s Executor.
CONCLUSION
Humphrey’s Executor was the product of a broad coalition of Su-
preme Court Justices concerned with the overexpansion of presiden-
tial power.  It legitimized the administrative state by enunciating a
230 See, e.g., Zeisler, supra note 176, at 269. R
231 See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Authority to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 292 n.129 (2006) (collecting cases).
232 In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 441–42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
233 See generally Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda–Hovencamp
Treatise in the Lower Courts and What it Means for Institutional Reforms in Antitrust, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 1919 (2015).
234 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 129 n.*
(2007) (reporting that “Commissioners Kempf, Litvak, and Shenefield would recommend elimi-
nating the FTC’s antitrust enforcement authority and vesting responsibility for all antitrust en-
forcement with the DOJ.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-6\GWN601.txt unknown Seq: 37 23-DEC-15 15:53
2015] DEBUNKING HUMPHREY’S EXECUTOR 1871
vision for Progressive-technocratic administrative legislating by inde-
pendent and nonpolitical experts, and adjudicating of anticompetitive
practices.  A century of experience has shown that the FTC’s actual
practice conforms very little to this vision.  It is independent from the
President but inclined to the will of Congress, not uniquely expert,
and not predominantly legislative or adjudicatory.  Rather, its pre-
dominant character is that of a law enforcement agency.
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APPENDIX235
Administrative Actions
Won:  FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th
Cir. 2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); North Carolina State Bd. of
Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (2013); Polypore Int’l, Inc. v.
FTC, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2012); Realcomp II, Ltd.  v. FTC, 635
F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011); Daniel Chapter One  v. FTC, 405 F. Appx.
505 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410
(5th Cir. 2008); North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346
(5th Cir. 2008) (FTC’s order overbroad, but liability upheld); Ken-
tucky Household Goods Carriers Ass’n v. FTC, 199 Fed. Appx. 410
(2006); South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436
(2006); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Toys “R” Us,
Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000); Jones v. FTC, 194 F.3d 1317
(9th Cir. 1999); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 998 F.2d 1129 (3d Cir.
1993) (won following Supreme Court remand); Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986
F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993); Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.
1992); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.
1992); Removatron Intern. Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d  1489 (1st Cir.
1989); Superior Court Trial Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev’d in part, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (1988); Figgie Intern. Inc. v. FTC, 817 F.2d 102
(1987); Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986); Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189 (1986); Southwest
Sunsites, Inc. v.  FTC, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (remedy nar-
rowed); Amrep Corp. v. FTC, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985); Indiana
Federation of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d 476
U.S. 447 (1986); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.
1984) Grolier v. FTC, 699 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1983); Bristol-Myers Co.
v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554 (5th
Cir. 1982); Lee v. FTC, 679 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); Litton Indus., Inc. v.
FTC, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982); Borden, Inc. v.  FTC, 674 F.2d 498
(6th Cir. 1982); American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 659 F.2d 681
(3d Cir. 1982); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.
235 Cases are categorized as won or lost by the FTC based on ultimate appellate resolution;
i.e., if there was an appeal to Supreme Court, Supreme Court resolution controls the win/loss
determination.  List excludes preliminary injunction actions pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 13(b).
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1979); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.
1979); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979); Jay Norris,
Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979); Trans World Accounts, Inc.
v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1979 (won in part, but order narrowed);
Simeon Manag. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978); Ash
Grove Cement v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1978); Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978); Rubbermaid, Inc. v. FTC,
575 F.2d 1169 (1978); National Com’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570
F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (won in part, but order narrowed); Liggett &
Myers, Inc. v. FTC, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1977); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561
F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d
Cir. 1976) (won in part, but order narrowed); Beatrice Foods Co. v.
FTC, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976); ITT Continental Baking Co. v.
FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976) (won in part, but order narrowed);
Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1976); Ger-Ro-Mar-Inc.
v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975); Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v.
FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1975); Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th
Cir. 1975); Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1975); Corning
Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975); Alterman Foods,
Inc. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1974); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,
497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974); Credit Card Serv. Corp. v. FTC, 495
F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Diener’s Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 1132 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1974); National
Dynamics Corp. v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Sunshine Art
Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1973); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC,
540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976); Charnita, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 684 (3d
Cir. 1973); National Ass’n of Women’s & Children’s Apparel Sales-
men, Inc. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1973);  Zale Corp. v. FTC, 473
F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1973).
Lost:  Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Scher-
ing-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); California
Dental v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000) (lost in Court of Appeals
following Supreme Court remand); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Southwest v. FTC, 85 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 1996); Trans Union Corp. v.
FTC, 81 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1996); New England Motor Rate Bureau,
Inc. v FTC, 908 F.2d 1064 (1st Cir. 1990); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,
837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Massachusetts Furniture & Piano
Movers Ass’n, Inc. v. FTC, 773 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1985); Borg-Warner
Corp. v. FTC, 746 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
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Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Russell Stover Candies, Inc.
v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982);Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346
(2d Cir. 1982); Equifax Inc. v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982);
Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981);
TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981); Coca-Cola Co. v.
FTC, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981);  Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v.
FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980); Jim Walter Corp. v. FTC, 625 F.2d
676 (5th Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th
Cir. 1980); Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1980); Fruehauf
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979); USLIFE Credit Corp. v.
FTC, 599 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1979);  SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807
(2d Cir. 1977); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971
(2d Cir. 1977), rev’d 435 U.S. 922 (1978); BOC Int’l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974);
Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
Judicial Actions
Won:  F.T.C. v. Lalonde, 545 Fed.Appx. 825 (11th Cir. 2013); FTC
v. LoanPointe, LLC, 525 F. Appx. 696 (10th Cir. 2013); FTC v. Chap-
man, 714 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2013);  FTC v. Washington Data Re-
sources, Inc., 704 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2013);  FTC v. Lucas, 483 Fed.
Appx. 378 (9th Cir. 2012); FTC v. Inc21.com Corp., 475 F. Appx. 106
(9th Cir. 2012);  FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2011); FTC v.
Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Magazine
Solutions, LLC, 432 F. Appx. 155 (3d Cir. 2011); FTC v. USA Finan-
cial, LLC, 415 F. Appx. 970 (11th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Direct Marketing
Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); FTC v. Network Services
Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2010); FTC v. Wells, 384 F. Appx.
712 (9th Cir. 2010); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010);
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